Su suggerimento e a cura di @paolo_paolo_ppa

Dallo Scientific American un articolo (di S. Alexander Haslam e Stephen D. Reicher) che analizza le dinamiche di gruppo che spingono verso la radicalizzazione, ricorrendo anche ai risultati di un esperimento (che si rifà a quelli più famosi di Milgram e Zimbardo).

Anche se vediamo i terroristi come sadici psicopatici, la psicologia sociale avverte che si tratta principalmente di persone comuni, spinte da dinamiche di gruppo a fare del male per una causa che loro credono essere nobile e giusta.

How do terror leaders attract such engaged, innovative followers if they are not giving direct orders? Other discoveries from the past few decades (summarized in our 2011 book, co-authored with Michael J. Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership) highlight the role leaders play in building a sense of shared identity and purpose for a group, helping members to frame their experiences.

Il terrorismo rimodella queste dinamiche di gruppo in modo tale che una leadership estremista appaia a tutti preferibile. Come l’ISIS trae forza dalla retorica dei politici occidentali non moderati, così questi stessi politici raccolgono consenso grazie all’estremismo dell’ISIS.

And here lies the real power in terrorism: it can be used to provoke other groups to treat one’s own group as dangerous—which helps to consolidate followers around those very leaders who preach greater enmity. Terrorism is not so much about spreading fear as it is about seeding retaliation and further conflict.
In February 2015 the ISIS-run magazine Dabiq carried an editorial entitled “The Extinction of the Grayzone.” […] They called for an end of the “gray zone” of constructive coexistence and the creation of a world starkly divided between Muslim and non-Muslim.

Una errata percezione, o negazione, di un’identità a cui altri danno valore genera sistematicamente rabbia e cinismo verso le autorità.

When we adapted Zimbardo’s prison study in our own research, we wanted to reexamine what happens when you mix two groups with unequal power. […] We have discussed the effects of these manipulations in many publications, but there is one finding we have not written about before—an observation that is especially relevant to our discussion of extremitization. From the outset of the study, one particular prisoner had very clear ambitions to be a future guard. He saw himself as capable of uniting the guards and getting them to work as a team (something with which they were having problems). Other prisoners teased him; they talked of mutiny, which he ignored. Then, during the promotion process, the guards overlooked this prisoner and promoted someone he viewed as weaker and less effective. His claim to guard identity had been publicly rebuffed in a humiliating way.
Almost immediately his demeanor and behavior changed. Previously he was a model inmate who shunned his fellow prisoners, but now he identified strongly with them. He had discouraged the prisoners from undermining the guards’ authority, but now he joined in with great enthusiasm. And although he had supported the old order and helped maintain its existence, he began to emerge as a key instigator of a series of subversive acts that ultimately led to the overthrow and destruction of the guards’ regime.

Al di fuori del loro esperimento gli autori vedono così la situazione: i leader della minoranza radicale utilizzano violenza e odio per provocare le autorità che rappresentano le maggioranze a istituire una cultura del sospetto nei confronti dei membri della minoranza.
Ciò porta a un’errato riconoscimento dell’altro, che a sua volta fa venir meno l’identificazione e il coinvolgimento nei valori dominanti.
E questa distanza può rendere più difficile da contrastare la retorica dei radicali. Ma quest’ultima non è di per sé sufficiente a radicalizzare qualcuno, e nemmeno lo è l’esperienza individuale: ciò che conta è la fusione delle due – retorica radicale ed esperienze individuali – e la loro capacità di amplificarsi a vicenda.

 

Immagine di Quinn Dombrowski via Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0