A cura di @Billy Pilgrim.

Con un articolo su Bloomberg, Tyler Cowen offre una riflessione originale sul problema del costo degli affitti nelle grandi città, partendo dalle teorie sulla rendita di economisti classici quali David Ricardo e Henry George.

Partendo dai modelli dei succitati economisti, l’autore arriva a sostenere che, quando il costo degli affitti è così alto da assorbire una gran parte del surplus sociale ed è impossibile costruire ulteriormente per requilibrare la situazione, viene a crearsi un sistema di incentivi perverso, per effetto del quale i residenti (in affitto) perdono interesse nel richiedere alla politica qualsiasi tipo di miglioramenti alla qualità della vita cittadina, perché molto del valore economico di detti miglioramenti verrebbe assorbito dai proprietari, spingendo nuovamente verso l’alto il costo degli affitti.

It is a commonplace observation that the rent is too damn high, at least in Manhattan, San Francisco, London, Vancouver and many of the world’s other glamour spots. Not only is this observation true — it’s worse than you think.

Complaints about the status quo tend to focus on how much renters have to pay out of pocket, or how hard it is to get on the home ownership track, or the problems businesses have in attracting talent. But another huge problem is one of political economy: As time goes on, governance in high-rent cities is likely to get more and more dysfunctional.

To see why, step back and consider two 19th-century “classical economists” who focused on high rents: David Ricardo and Henry George. Both built models where land is so scarce that the cost of renting land absorbs most of the social surplus. We are not (yet?) at that point, but these models give insight into where today’s most expensive cities are headed.

Consider an increase in the quality of public services — say, garbage collection, or perhaps in San Francisco the elimination of public urination. You might think that would make life much better for everyone. But in a Ricardo-George model, that is not the case. Mainly what happens is that rents go up and landowners capture most of the newly created surplus.

Immagine da pxhere.